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INFORMATION FROM RELATIONSHIP LENDING: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 
 
ABSTRACT 
We study the economic role of banks’ soft information, which evolved from repeated lending 
relationships, in the context of loan default. Using a proprietary database from one of the largest 
state-owned commercial banks in China, we find that the bank’s internal credit rating scores play a 
significant role in default prediction. While the internal credit rating incorporates firm-specific hard 
information such as financial ratios, it is the soft information component of these ratings that 
contributes to the improvement in assessing credit quality. More importantly, the relative 
importance of soft information over hard information depends on the depth of the lending 
relationship. When evaluating loan delinquency, a strong lending relationship allows soft 
information to substitute for, rather than complement to, the role of hard information, especially the 
hard information that is subject to easy manipulation by Chinese firms. 
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INFORMATION FROM RELATIONSHIP LENDING: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical literature on financial intermediation has long recognized the superior ability of 
banks in acquiring information or knowledge beyond that which is available to ordinary financial market 
participants (e.g., Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986, Diamond 1991, and Dow and 
Gorton 1997). Many researchers emphasize the “soft” nature of this special knowledge in the notion that 
soft information is not easily and accurately conveyed, verifiable, or transferable. In contrast to the “hard” 
information derived from firms’ financial statements or industrial data, most researchers attribute soft 
information to banks’ relationships with borrowing firms (e.g., Peterson 2004). In light of the central role 
of the banking system in channeling capital to the real economy, however, few studies have directly 
examined the nature and significance of this special knowledge in predicting defaults on commercial 
loans. 
In this paper we investigate to what extent this special knowledge can predict loan defaults, and 
whether it acts as a complement or a substitute for any particular type of hard information in accessing 
credit delinquency. Using a proprietary dataset from a major Chinese state-owned bank containing 
information on all loans offered to Chinese firms during the period of 2003-2006, we first document a 
substantial decline in loan defaults after the implementation of an internal credit rating system in 2004. 
Internal credit ratings are significantly related to the commonly used firm-specific financial ratios in 
predictable ways, and changes in these financial ratios lead to changes in credit ratings. These findings 
suggest that, at least with regard to credit ratings, loan decisions by Chinese banks are based on 
commercial principles instead of government policies, which may have contributed to the overall 
performance improvement of the Chinese banks in recent years.1 
                                                 
1 Since 2002, major state-owned commercial banks in China have embarked on a series of reforms, which have 
generally gone through the following four stages: financial reorganization, injection of new capital by the state, 
introduction of foreign strategic investors, and eventual IPOs. Amid the banks’ financial reorganization efforts is the 
introduction of an internal credit rating system. Concurrently, the average non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of the 
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Furthermore, our analysis reveals that the bank’s internal credit ratings largely subsume firm-
specific hard information, as the majority of the commonly used financial ratios are no longer significant 
in predicting loan defaults after including these ratings. Therefore, we next investigate to what extent the 
improvement in loan quality is due to the bank’s soft information arising from extensive 
borrowing/lending relationships, instead of relying on firm-specific hard information. 
To extract the firm-specific soft information component from the bank’s private credit rating 
score, we follow Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) and orthogonalize the credit rating with the firm’s 
financial factors. To capture the nature of soft information generated from a repeated lending relationship, 
we construct three proxies to identify the depth of banking relationship. Our first proxy is based on a 
firm’s ownership, in which we classify a firm as either state-owned or non-state-owned. Since a state 
bank’s lending relationship with state-owned firms is historically mandated by the Chinese government, 
this proxy is relatively exogenous and thus mitigates the endogeneity of matching between a firm and its 
bank that typically affects such studies (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005). The other two 
proxies are based on the frequency of corporate borrowing, and the length of the banking relationship. 
We find that the bank’s internal credit ratings contain useful information beyond that which is 
conveyed by the commonly used financial and industrial variables. This soft information, captured by the 
residual component of the internal credit rating that is unpredictable by these variables, is statistically and 
economically significant in forecasting loan defaults. Our result thus provides evidence in support of the 
theoretical arguments that banks possess special knowledge in assessing credit quality.   
More importantly, for state-owned firms, firms that borrow more frequently from the bank, and 
firms that have a longer period of banking relationship, the majority of proxies for hard information are 
no longer significant in predicting loan default once the soft information component of internal credit 
rating is included. By contrast, for firms that are not state-owned, borrow less frequently from the bank, 
or have a shorter period of banking relationship, most proxies for hard information remain significant 
                                                                                                                                                             
major commercial banks in China decreased from 18% in 2002 to 5% in 2007. In a companion paper, we investigate 
other potential factors responsible for the decline of NPL ratio in Chinese banks. 
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even in the presence of the bank’s soft information. Our findings indicate that the extent to which soft 
information dominates hard information depends on the depth of the lending relationship, and that an 
extensive lending relationship allows soft information to substitute for, rather than complement to, the 
role of hard information in evaluating loan delinquency. 
Interestingly, for state-owned firms and firms that maintain a long-term or frequent banking 
relationship, it is the hard information that can be easily manipulated by Chinese firms – such as ROA – 
that is displaced by the bank’s soft information. In contrast, the hard information that is not subject to 
easy manipulation remains significant in predicting loan defaults even after the inclusion of the bank’s 
soft information. Our analysis on earnings management further confirms this finding. The economic 
impact of soft information is significantly more pronounced among firms with higher level of earnings 
management, especially among state-owned firms and those that maintain a frequent or long-term 
relationship with the bank. 
Our paper contributes to the finance literature analyzing the role of hard and soft information in 
bank lending. Most of the literature focuses on small business financing and on loan underwriting and 
pricing (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994, Berger and Udell 1995, Scott 2004, Uchida, Udell and Yamori 
2007, and Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena 2008). Instead, we study the role of soft information in the 
context of loan default. Our research design and unique dataset allow us to disentangle the soft 
information that is ascertained through repeated lending relationships from the one being driven either by 
bank competition and relative size or by geographical proximity. In addition, we directly assess the 
importance of banks’ soft information for large firms and industrial loans, which is usually absent from 
the literature. 
Our paper is related to Grunert, Norden, and Weber (2005) who find that the combined use of 
financial and non-financial factors of credit rating scores predicts more accurately loan defaults by 
German firms than the use of either financial or non-financial factors alone, and to Agrawal and 
Hauswald (2008) who document that the soft information component of a credit rating predicts loan 
defaults of small firms. Differing from the former, we show that soft information evolved through 
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extensive lending relationships not only improves default prediction, but also prevails over the effect of 
financial factors. Differing from the latter, we establish that soft information plays an important role for 
large firms and commercial loans, despite the fact that there tends to be more hard information about large 
firms. In addition, we show that the effect of soft information is more profound in the presence of a 
stronger lending relationship.  
Our paper is also related to the literature analyzing how financial and industrial factors predict 
corporate bankruptcy (e.g., Altman 1968). Instead, we focus on loan default. Our findings complement 
this literature by indicating that hard information, derived from firm’s financial statements, predicts not 
only a firm’s bankruptcy but also short-term loan delinquency.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses institutional details about 
China’s banking system and recent banking reforms, and the uniqueness of our research setting. Section 3 
describes our sources of data. Section 4 reports the results on the determinants of loan default and internal 
credit rating. Section 5 examines the role of soft information. Section 6 discusses various tests for 
robustness. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. CHINA’S BANKING SYSTEM AND RESEARCH SETTING 
2.1 The role of the big four 
In an attempt to model after the Soviet in which a centralized banking system is used to support a 
central planning economy, China established the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in December of 1948. 
Prior to 1978, the PBOC served as both a central bank and a commercial bank. 
In 1978, China embarked on a market-oriented economic reform. Accordingly, four state-owned 
banks – the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China – were established during the period of 1979-1984. The so-called “big 
four” serve financing needs from four respective sectors: agriculture, foreign trade, infrastructure 
construction, and manufacturing industries. After 1984, however, each of the “big four” was allowed to 
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broaden the scope of their operations into other banks’ sectors amid China’s effort to introduce 
competitions among banks. 
Throughout the time the firm-bank relationship is mandated by the government instead of driven 
by commercial principles. Most of the state-owned banks’ loans were originated to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) based on political and policy considerations. With the concerns for social instability 
accompanied with rising unemployment, loans are continuously granted by the banks to pay workers’ 
compensations despite that SOEs remain unprofitable and non-competitive. Consequently, non-
performing loans (NPLs) piled up on banks’ financial statements. 
From 1986 to 1996, approximately 11 more banks, including the Bank of Communication, China 
Merchants’ Bank, Pudong Development Bank, and Shenzhen Development Bank, were established in 
order to increase the competitiveness of the China’s banking industry. These banks are usually jointly 
owned by several legal entities such as local governments and enterprises. Although the legal entities are 
usually state-owned, these “joint-stock” banks are smaller, albeit more efficiently run, than the big four 
state-owned banks. 
In 1995, the State Council of China announced that credit unions – previously existed in many 
Chinese cities – can no longer be transformed into city cooperative banks through equity contributions 
from local governments, enterprises, and local citizens. During the same year, China passed the “Central 
Bank Law” and “Commercial Bank Law”, explicitly specifying the functions, rights and duties between 
the central bank (PBOC) and commercial banks. In 2003, China established the Banking Regulatory 
Commission to take over part of the regulatory duties previously held by the PBOC. In turn, the PBOC 
focuses on its macroeconomic and monetary responsibilities. 
China permits foreign banks to conduct business in the mainland China starting 1979. Initially, 
most of the foreign banks’ business is restricted to foreign currency exchange. As a precondition to join 
the WTO, China pledged the commitment to open its domestic currency (RMB) business to all foreign 
banks by 2006.  
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2.2 The reform of China’s commercial banks 
Mounting non-performing loans have long plagued the financial statements of China’s 
commercial banks, especially the “big four”. In 1997, 30% of all the loans outstanding were NPLs. By 
2003, this ratio was still as high as 20%. The high percentage of NPLs was usually attributed to (1) the 
government’s direct or indirect ownership and control of commercial banks to pursue its political and 
policy agendas, (2) inefficient operation and soft budget constraint associated with some SOE borrowers, 
and (3) ineffectiveness in enforcing the bankruptcy law. 
The Chinese government has since initiated a series of reforms to curb the increasing risk 
associated with the high level of NPLs. In 1998, 270 billion RMB was injected by the Finance Ministry to 
replenish the deteriorating capital of the big four state-owned banks, followed by a transfer of 1.4 trillion 
RMB NPLs (at their face value) from these banks to the corresponding four newly created Assets 
Management Companies in 1999. 
As the next step of the reform, the government “corporatizes” the state-owned banks by 
introducing foreign strategic investors and then listing these banks on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
and/or the Shanghai Stock Exchange. In late 2003, the government injected $22.5 billion each into the 
Bank of China and China Construction Bank as equity capital, and corporatized the two as joint-stock 
commercial banks. In 2004, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, Bank of America, and TEMASEK took 
minority equity positions in these two banks as strategic investors. China Construction Bank went public 
in 2005. The state retained a controlling stake (67.49%) of the bank after its listing on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. After the Bank of China’s IPO in both Hong Kong and Shanghai in 2006, the state’s 
equity stake was 59.12%. 
In 2005, $15 billion were used to capitalize the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), 
which was then reorganized and corporatized. Goldman Sachs, Allianz, and American Express bought a 
total of 8.44% of its equity. ICBC became publicly traded on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock 
exchanges in 2006. After its IPO, the state controls 72.47% of the shares. 
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Many believe that the banking reforms since 2003, including bank restructuring, introduction of 
strategic investors, and public listings, have fundamentally changed the corporate governance and risk 
management practices of Chinese state-owned banks. A direct consequence is the lower NPL ratios.  
Nevertheless, doubts remained about the effectiveness of these banking reforms and subsequently, the 
competence of China’s state-owned banking system.  
 
2.3 Chinese banks as a research setting 
We obtain a large dataset from one of the big-four state-owned commercial banks in China. With 
2.5 million corporate customers and 150 million individual customers, our bank maintains a dominating 
lending position in China. As of 2006, it had assets of RMB 7,055 billion (US$893 billion), with over 
18,000 outlets including 106 overseas branches and agents globally.  
The research setting offers several unique features. Banks play a dominating role in China’s 
financial system. In 2004 alone, bank loans account for 83% of external capital raised by non-financial 
firms, in comparison with 5% of external capital raised from equity market and 12% from public debt 
market. Unlike many other developed countries where bank lending is predominant among small 
businesses, Chinese firms rely mainly on bank financing regardless of the scopes of their businesses and 
scales of their operations. 
Within China’s banking system, the big four state-owned banks dominate the loan market. By the 
end of 2004, the “big four” account for 55% market share in terms of asset scale. With each of the big 
four banks specializing in a specific area of lending, the impact of competition from other banks is either 
non-existent or at most marginal. This mitigates the issues of bank size and competition that commonly 
affect such studies.  
The unique setting of China’s banking system also allows us to concentrate on the nature and role 
of firm-specific soft information obtained by the bank from its long-term and repeated lending 
relationships. As discussed later in Section 5, one of our proxies for the depth of banking relationship is 
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based on whether or not a firm is state-owned.2 Since state banks’ relationship with state-owned firms is 
historically mandated by the Chinese government, this proxy is relatively exogenous and consequently, 
mitigates the endogeneity of matching between a firm and its bank that typically affects such studies 
(Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005). In addition, the state-ownership historically mandates 
the mapping of a nationwide distribution of bank branches. Since the backbone of our bank’s branch 
network was originally set up exogenously, instead of evolving endogenously based on the regional 
economic development as in previous studies for developed economies, the soft information in our 
analysis is less likely to be driven by distance, but rather through repeated lending.  
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Data sources 
We obtain a large dataset from one of the big-four state-owned commercial banks in China, 
which consists of year-end information on all the outstanding loans made to 15 subcategories of five 
manufacturing industries from 2003 to 2006. 3 For each loan outstanding, our dataset contains information 
on its principal amount, maturity date, the province in which the loan was originated, interest rate, 
repayment status if the loan is due during the year, the borrowing firm’s financial statements, ownership 
structure, and the industry where the firm operates.  
Starting 2004, the bank implemented an internal credit rating system.4 For any given year, the 
bank assigns a credit rating score to a borrowing firm at the time when it grants the firm’s first loan of 
                                                 
2 Our paper studies how information arising from long-term or repeated lending relationships affects defaults on 
outstanding loans. The impact of information on loan approvals or rejections, though an interesting issue, is beyond 
the scope of the paper. By focusing on the prediction of loan defaults instead of loan approvals, state-ownership as a 
proxy for lending relationship is not affected by whether loans are granted for political or policy considerations. 
3 Our bank maintains an industry classification system similar to the Industrial Classification for National Economic 
Activities from the Bureau of Statistics of China. 
4 Most banks in the United States have had internal credit ratings for at least since the 1980s. Note also that internal 
credit rating differs from credit scoring. Small business credit scoring (SBCS) in the United States was introduced in 
1995 and applies to only micro business loans. By basically adapting consumer lending practices to micro business 
lending, credit scoring is mostly focused on using mercantile ratings and consumer credit bureau reports on the 
entrepreneur. It is best viewed as a subset of internally rated loans. In the case of SBCS, the entire loan underwriting 
process is limited to the score. Several studies have shown that the implementation of SBCS improves small 
business lending (Frame, Srinivasan, and Wooseley 2001 and Berer, Frame and Miller 2005). China introduces the 
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that year. The credit rating score ranks from 1 to 12, with 1 being the lowest (poorest credit quality) and 
12 the highest (highest credit quality). Our dataset thus also contains all rating information between 2004 
and 2006. 
For each loan outstanding, its repayment status will be noted by the bank at the end of the 
following year in one of the following categories: repaid, unpaid, and written off. To ensure the 
conservativeness of our analysis, we define a loan in the stage of default if the principal is unpaid or 
written off by the due date. Since this definition is essentially restricted to whether the loan is repaid on 
time, it is narrower in the sense that other violations of loan covenants are not considered as default.  
Our dataset contains 40,740 bank loans made between 2003 and 2006. There are 13 ownership 
categories for the borrowing firms in our sample, including state-owned, collectively-owned, state-
controlled (in which the state has a controlling stake), collectively-controlled (in which a collectively-
owned entity has a controlling stake), foreign-owned and joint ventures, privately-owned, proprietorship, 
and joint-stock companies. We remove 2,667 loans borrowed by collectively-owned and collectively-
controlled firms due to their ambiguous nature, 5  as well as loans borrowed by firms with missing 
ownership information. 
In what follows, we first provide a general description of loan characteristics for our overall 
sample. We then discuss our sample selection procedure for the regression analysis on internal credit 
ratings.  
 
3.2 Loan characteristics for Chinese firms 
For the descriptive analyses, we include all loans in our dataset that are originated during a given 
calendar year with a specific maturity date in a different calendar year. With only the end-of-year data 
                                                                                                                                                             
internal credit rating system to its banks following the economic reforms. However, there is still a lack of 
development of credit scoring for either small businesses or consumers.  
5 The ambiguous nature of collectively-owned firms and their unique ownership arrangements are discussed and 
analyzed in details in Chang and Wang (1994). 
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available, short-term loans made and repaid in the same calendar year are not included in the sample 
unless there is a default.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the two main loan characteristics – size and maturity – 
over our sample period. We observe that short-term loans constitute the major source of funding for 
Chinese firms. In fact, on average 95% of loans in our sample have a maturity of one year or less, 
accounting for 84.45% of the aggregate outstanding principals. By contrast, loans of medium or long-term 
maturity, as well as firms receiving such kind of loans, are dramatically rare. Loans with maturity 
exceeding one year account for only 15.54% of total outstanding principal. 
Table 1 indicates that unlike micro loans commonly seen in small business lending practices, our 
sample loans are dominated by commercial loans, which are less studied in the literature. For example, a 
back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the average principal of loans with one year maturity is RMB 
47.069 million in 2005, approximately $5.85 million. For loans with maturity exceeding one year, the 
average loan size is even higher: RMB 168.993 million, or approximately $21.02 million.6  
Table 1 also compares the loan characteristics between state-owned and non-state-owned firms. 
While the number of non-state-owned firms receiving bank financing far exceeds the number of state-
owned firms, and the number of short-term loans (maturity of one year or less) originated to non-state-
owned firms is higher, state-owned firms receive on average larger principal amount than non-state-
owned firms. Starting 2004, the year when our bank introduced its internal credit rating system for 
individual firms, there is a steady increase in number of firms without state background securing short-
term, medium-term, and long-term loans, and in number of loans as well as principal amount initiated for 
such kind of firms. On the other hand, there is a steady decrease in both number of firms being funded 
and number of loans and principal amount initiated for state-owned firms. Despite that state-owned firms 
overall borrow at a larger amount than non-state-owned firms, especially for loans of long-term maturity, 
the gap between the two diminishes. In 2006, both types borrow almost equal amount.  
 
                                                 
6 Based on an average exchange rate between 2003 and 2006 of $1 = RMB 8.04. 
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3.3 Crediting rating and loan default rate 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the bank’s internal credit rating scores and the 
subsequent short-term loan default rates. Since the bank implemented an internal credit rating system in 
2004, we restrict the analysis to the 2004-2006 period. Table 2 reveals that internal credit rating for firms 
borrowing short-term loans generally increases over this period. For example, the average rating for one-
year loans increases from 7.9 in 2004 to 8.4 in 2006. Since short-term loans constitute the majority of 
loans outstanding, this indicates an overall improvement in loan quality during the sample period, 
probably due to a tougher and more skilled screening process by the bank for the borrowers. 
When partitioning the sample into state-owned and non-state-owned sub-samples, it is the state-
owned firms that attribute to this overall improvement in credit quality. At the time when the bank 
implemented the internal rating system, state-owned firms on average had significantly lower rating 
scores – therefore poorer credit quality – than non-state-owned firms for loans with a maturity of less than 
one year (7.377 for state-owned firms versus 7.921 for non-state-owned firms). Over time, however, loans 
initiated to state-owned firms are consistently rated higher than those for non-state-owned firms, 
especially over longer maturities. For example, the average internal rating score for loans with medium 
maturity (more than one year but less than five years) in 2006 is 1.44 higher for state-owned firms 
(10.026 for state-owned firms versus 8.587 for non-state-owned firms). The difference is also statistically 
significant.  
Table 2 reveals that consistent with the improvement in credit rating of short-term loans over our 
sample period, there is a decline in loan defaults for all sample firms. Prior to the implementation of the 
internal credit rating system, 14.71% of firms with loans of less than one year maturity and 16.97% of 
firms with one year loans originated in 2003 are in the stage of default by 2004. After the installment of 
the internal credit rating system there is a sharp decline in loan defaults despite that the number of short-
term loans has increased. For example, 13.03% of firms with one year loans originated in 2004 – the year 
when the internal credit rating system is in place – are in the default stage by 2005, a 23% drop. 
Furthermore, only 4.37% of firms with one year loans originated in 2005 are in default in 2006. 
 
 12
Interestingly, the decline is more dramatic for stated-owned firms: 25.7% loans of less than one 
year maturities are pass-due in 2004, whereas in 2006 only 3.1% of such loans are pass-due. In addition, 
while the default rate on loans originated in 2003 for state-owned firms on average is higher than for non-
state-owned firms, the difference between the two groups of firms is no longer statistically significant for 
loans originated in 2005. 
 
4. LOAN DEFAULT AND INTERNAL CREDIT RATING 
We now evaluate the economic role of the bank’s information, captured by its private credit 
rating score, in the context of predicting loan default. By restricting our attention to a sub-sample 
containing short-term loans, default status, internal rating scores, and firms’ financial information, we 
attempt to identify firm-specific factors that can potentially affect the incentive to default. We then 
investigate whether credit rating scores have additional predictive power after controlling for firm-
specific factors known to affect default propensity.  
Next, we explore the information content of the bank’s internal credit rating by examining 
whether these ratings take into account of firm’s fundamentals, and whether there is any evidence that the 
bank possesses additional proprietary information in evaluating credit delinquency. By parsing the rating 
score into a “hard” information component and a “soft” information component, based on the predicted 
and unpredicted components of credit rating score with respect to firm’s fundamentals, we examine 
whether the soft information component has any predictive power. Since a bank’s soft information 
evolves from its lending relationship with the firm, we further investigate whether the role of soft 
information differs depending on the depth of lending relationship. 
 
4.1 Sample selection 
We begin by extracting a sub-sample of loan data based on the following filtering criteria. Since 
our loan sample ends in 2006 and some loans initiated in 2006 require payment information in 2007, we 
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restrict our regression analysis to the sample containing short-term loans with a maturity date no later than 
2006. 
We concentrate on short-term loans (maturity of one year or less). This is because to identify the 
default status for medium and long-term loans requires information extended beyond one year. To avoid 
over-estimating default rate, for loans with a maturity less than one year, we only include those initiated 
on and after July 1st of year 2004 or 2005 with a maturity exceeding six months, which allow us to 
identify their default status during the period of 2005-2006. This yields a sub-sample of 2,878 firm-year 
observations.  
We remove 428 observations with missing internal rating scores, 167 observations with missing 
financial statement information, 220 observations due to missing sales growth rate. Our final sample 
contains 2,063 observations. The detailed variable descriptions are provided in Appendix I. 
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics between firms that defaulted on their loans and those that 
did not. There is preliminary evidence that the bank’s internal credit rating predicts loan default as the 
rating differs depending on whether or not the loans are in subsequent default stage. For example, among 
loans initiated in 2004, those that were in default in 2005 have an average internal credit score of 5.38 
associated with the borrowers, compared to the average score of 8.30 for those that were not in default. 
Firms defaulting on their loans also have a significantly higher degree of leverage, poorer profitability 
(measured by return on assets, or ROA), lower asset turnover, and smaller cash reserves.  
Interestingly, Panels B and C show that the above observed default characteristics are similar 
between state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms. This suggests that most of the firm-specific 
fundamental factors that affect loan default are relatively universal across Chinese firms. 
Lastly, both the average annual book value of total assets and annual number of employees in 
Table 3 indicate that our sample is not dominated by small manufacturing firms, even for firms that have 
defaulted their loans. For example, firms that borrowed short-term loans in 2004 and then defaulted in 
2005 averaged total assets of RMB 371 million, and number of employees of 1,160. For our sample firms 
over this two-year period, the mean and median number of employees per firm are 2,345 and 405, 
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respectively (not reported). Unlike small businesses analyzed by the majority of previous studies, our 
sample firms have a relatively large operating scale and asset base. Our study hence sheds light on the 
characteristics and economic impact of relationship lending associated with commercial loans and large 
industrial firms.  
 
4.2 Can hard information and internal credit rating predict loan default? 
We start with a correlation analysis to identify the relationship between firm-specific hard 
information – including fundamental factors derived from their financial statements – and the subsequent 
loan defaults. As indicated in Table 4, a higher loan default rate is correlated with smaller asset base, 
greater leverage, state firms, and poorer operating performance in terms of ROA, asset turnover, cash 
reserve, and sales growth. A higher loan default rate is also correlated with a lower internal credit rating.  











   
Our dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a firm is in the stage of defaulting its loan, and 
zero otherwise. Our independent variables include lagged firm-specific factors that could affect the 
default propensity: size, leverage, return on assets, asset turnover, cash reserve, sales growth, a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is state-owned,7 and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is publicly 
traded. We include log(GDP) to control for potential clustering of bank branches and borrowing firms 
based on local economic conditions.8 In addition, we control for both industry and year fixed-effects, 
industry  and year .  
                                                 
7 In 2005, among the 1,066 firms in our sample we observe 12 firms changed their ownership from state-owned to 
non-state-owned. Excluding these 12 firms does not alter our findings.  
8 In the untabulated descriptive statistics, there is evidence that bank branches and ownership-based borrowers may 
cluster in certain areas based on local economic conditions. During the sample period of 2003-2006, 7.4% of firms 
in regions of high economic development are state-owned firms, while 40% of firms in regions of medium economic 
development and 37.6% in regions of low economic development are state-owned firms. Nevertheless, the fraction 
of state-owned firms decreases over time, regardless of the level of economic development. For example, the 
proportion of state-owned firms decreases from 13.2% in 2003 to 4.3% in 2006 in regions of high economic 
 
 15
Model 1 of Table 5 presents the probit regression results. For each variable we report both the 
coefficient estimate and the marginal effect. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Model 1 indicates 
that hard information, captured by a firm’s fundamentals, can significantly predict loan default. 
Specifically, firms with a larger asset base, lower leverage, higher profitability, faster asset turnover, 
larger cash reserves, and operating in the regions of more advanced economic development tend to have a 
lower propensity of default.  
In addition, the dummy variable for state-owned firms is positive and significant, but the 
coefficient for the interaction term between the dummy and size is negatively significant. This suggests 
that while state-owned firms tend to have a higher probability of default, this probability declines if such 
firms have a large asset base.  
To examine whether the bank’s internal credit rating, implemented nation-wide for all the 
branches, has any additional predictive power for loan default, we next include the bank’s internal credit 
rating score in the previous regression model. 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 5 suggest that internal credit rating is significantly negatively related to 
the probability of default, regardless whether or not the proxies for firm-specific hard information are 
included. Specifically, one level increase in the internal credit rating (higher score) leads to a 1.8% lower 
probability of default (Model 3).  
Interestingly, Model 3 reveals that once the internal credit rating is included, most of the proxies 
for firm-specific hard information – fundamental factors identified in Model 1 to help predict the 
probability of loan default, such as firm size, leverage, profitability, and asset turnovers – are no longer 
statistically significant. This suggests that internal credit rating scores subsume the effect of these factors.  
We also observe from Model 3 that the coefficient associated with the dummy for state-owned 
firms is no longer significant after including the internal credit rating variable, and that the coefficient for 
                                                                                                                                                             
development. The fraction decreases from 47.7% in 2003 to 32% in 2006, and from 42.7% in 2003 to 30.5% in 2006, 
in regions of medium and low economic development, respectively. In addition, loans initiated for firms from the 
regions of medium or low economic development do not necessarily rate lower than those of high economic 
development. In fact, loans initiated for the regions of medium economic development in 2006 on average have a 
higher quality than those of high economic development.  
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the interaction term between the dummy and the size variable becomes marginally significant. This is in 
contrast with the results of Model 1 where, in the absence of rating, both coefficients are significant at 5% 
level. This comparison provides preliminary evidence that internal credit rating is more informative about 
state-owned firms, with whom the bank tends to have a long-term relationship. 
 
4.3 The information content of internal credit rating 
The results from Table 5 show that the bank’s internal credit rating scores are significantly related 
to the probability of default. Most of fundamental factors are no longer significant after including these 
rating scores, which suggests that internal credit rating scores incorporate the majority, if not all, of firm-
specific hard information.  
We next regress internal credit rating scores against these proxies for firm-specific hard 
information identified in Model 1 of Table 5. The OLS results from Panel A, Table 6 presents evidence 
that internal credit ratings do take into account firm-specific fundamental factors expected to affect loan 
default. Not surprisingly, larger asset base, lower leverage, greater profitability, faster asset turnover, 
higher level of cash reserve and sales growth lead to better credit quality and more favorable credit score. 
While state-owned firms on average are associated with low credit rating scores, this effect is more 
pronounced for firms of smaller size, as the coefficient associated with the interaction term is positive and 
significant.  
Model 1 shows that these proxies for firm-specific hard information together explain 
approximately 42% of a firm’s internal credit rating score. The rest two columns of Panel A, Table 6 
indicate that there is a difference between state-owned and non-state-owned firms: For state-owned firms, 
firm-specific fundamentals are able to explain over 60% of the internal credit ratings, whereas they can 
explain only 36% for firms without state ownership. This suggests that financial information is more 
credible for firms that maintain a long-term banking relationship, and therefore is taken into account to a 
greater extent by the bank. In contrast, financial information from firms that do not maintain a long-term 
banking relationship is less influential when the bank sets its internal credit rating scores. 
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Panel B adopts a difference-in-difference analysis and examines whether a change in firm-
specific hard information such as a firm’s fundamental characteristics leads to a subsequent change in the 
internal credit rating. In the OLS regression, the dependent variable is the change in the internal credit 
rating. In the ordered probit regression, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a firm’s internal credit 
rating improves from 2004 to 2005, or from 2005 to 2006, -1 if deteriorates, and 0 otherwise. 
We observe that a change in asset base, leverage, and operating performance is significantly 
related to a subsequent change in internal credit rating. The ordered probit result suggests that an increase 
in asset base and operating performance measured by ROA and asset turnover leads to a higher internal 
credit rating, while an increase in leverage leads to a lower rating.  
To summarize, our multivariate regression analysis and difference-in-difference analysis indicate 
that the bank’s internal credit rating takes into account of firm-specific hard information such as firm’s 
fundamental factors previously identified to predict loan default. In addition, these factors matter more if 
the firm has a long-term relationship with the bank. 
 
5. THE ROLE OF SOFT INFORMATION 
Our findings in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that being able to explain less than 42% of the internal 
credit rating, firm-specific hard information – captured by firms’ fundamentals – is not sole determinant 
of the bank’s internal credit rating. In addition, results from Table 5 indicate that most known 
fundamental factors are no longer statistically significantly predicting loan default once the international 
rating scores are included in the probit regression. This suggests that the bank possesses superior 
informational advantage when evaluating loan defaults.  
 
5.1 Proxies for soft information and the depth of relationship lending 
We follow an approach similar to Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) and parse the internal credit 
rating into a hard information component and a soft information component, which we define statistically 
based on the firm-specific fundamental information available during the period the rating score is 
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assigned. Specifically, we obtain the fitted values and residuals of the internal credit rating score from the 
overall sample result in Panel A, Table 6 (first column). In this case, Bank Specialty, measured by the 
residual component of the internal credit rating, captures the soft information arising from the bank’s own 
assessment, monitoring, knowledge and experiences.  
To identify whether or not this soft information is pertinent to relationship lending, we adopt 
three proxies for the depth of relationship. Our first proxy is based on whether a firm is owned or 
controlled by the state. Since historically, the Chinese government mandates the banking relationship with 
state-owned firms, the bank has more interactions with state-owned firms than non-state-owned firms. 
More importantly, this relationship is forged exogenously, and therefore is not subject to the doubt-
matching endogeneity problem commonly seen in the existing literature.  
Tables 1 through 3 indicate that there is a significant difference in number of firms, loan size, 
assets and employees between state-owned and non-state-owned sub-samples. To ensure the 
conservativeness of our analysis, for each sample year, we match a state-owned firm with a non-state-
owned firm by industry and size.9 We then compare the role of the bank’s soft information over the two 
matched sub-samples. 
Our second proxy is based on the frequency of borrowing over our sample period. For each firm, 
we compute the total number of loans outstanding with the bank over this period. We then classify a firm 
as an infrequent borrower if its number of loans falls below the sample median of 12. A firm is a frequent 
borrower if its number of loans outstanding is above 12.  
Our last proxy is based on the duration of the banking relationship. Since the bank assigns its 
internal credit rating score at the time when it grants the first loan to the firm in a given year, for each 
firm in a given year (2004 or 2005), we identify the month when it obtains its first loan. We then trace 
back the firm’s loan information prior to this month. The duration variable is then calculated as the 
difference between the current month and the earliest recorded time among all the loans borrowed by the 
                                                 
9 For a given year and a given industry, we start with the smallest state-owned firm and match in size with a non-
state-owned firm within the same industry. We then move to the next smallest state-owned firm and locate its match. 
Match is conducted without replacement.   
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firm prior to the current month. Since we can check a firm’s historical loan records based on information 
available during the four-year sample interval (between 2003 and 2006), we choose the cut-off point of 
two years (24 months). If a firm’s duration of its banking relationship exceeds 24 months, then we 
classify it as having a long-term relationship with the bank. If, on the other hand, a firm’s duration of 
relationship is less than 24 months, then we classify it as having a short-term banking relationship.10 
 If the bank’s soft information about a firm arises from its sustained lending relationship with the 
firm, then we should observe that the economic role of soft information is more prominent in predicting 
default for state-owned-firms, as well as for firms that borrow more frequently or have a longer 
relationship with the bank.  
 
5.2 Soft information, relationship lending, and loan default 
To examine whether the bank’s soft information matters in predicting loan defaults, we replace 
the internal credit rating variable with Bank Specialty, and re-run the regression of Model 3, Table 5. 
Table 7 reports the probit regression results for state-owned and non-state-owned firms, frequent and 
infrequent corporate borrowers, and for firms that have a short and long-term relationship with the bank, 
respectively. 
Table 7 shows that the bank’s soft information is significantly related to default propensity, 
regardless firm’s ownership, borrowing frequency, and the length of banking relationship. The negative 
coefficient for Bank Specialty suggests that greater proprietary information leads to a lower probability of 
default.  
Although the difference in the coefficient for Bank Specialty between state-owned and non-state-
owned firms is not statistically significant, it is economically significant. While a 1% increase in bank’s 
                                                 
10 Since this proxy is measured against the short sample period, it tends to be noisier in capturing the interaction 
between the firm and the bank than the proxies based on firms’ ownership and borrowing frequency. A firm might 
have secured loans from the bank prior to the beginning of our sample period and beyond the records that are 
traceable. It then had little borrowing activities since then. In this case it is possible that such firms are classified as 
being associated with a short-term banking relationship. However, this type of misclassification works against 
finding the difference between firms of short- and long-term banking relationships. In addition, our focus on short-
term lending activities, instead of long-term loans, helps to mitigate this potential misclassification problem. 
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specialty is associated with a 2% lower probability of commercial loan default for state-owned firms. The 
same increase leads to only a 1.4% decline in propensity of default for non-state-owned firms, a 30% drop 
in terms of marginal effect.  
In addition, for state-owned firms, almost all the proxies for hard information are no longer 
significant after including Bank Specialty. This suggests that the bank’s soft information, arising from a 
long-term and repeated lending relationship, substitutes almost all the hard information, and is almost 
capable of predicting loan defaults alone.  
In contrast, for the non-state-firms where such a profound lending relationship rarely exists, Bank 
Specialty is unable to prevail over all the hard information. Even for the non-state-owned firms of a 
similar size and operating in the same industry as the state-owned firms, nearly half of the firm-specific 
fundamental factors remain statistically significant even in the presence of Bank Specialty. This suggests 
that the lack of a long-term lending relationship leads to the soft information possessed by the bank less 
capable of evaluating loan defaults for these firms. 
We observe the similar results from the rest of Table 7 when the other two proxies are used to 
capture the depth of the existing lending relationship. The bank’s soft information prevails over hard 
information for firms that borrow frequently from the bank, and for firms that begin their relationship 
with the bank early.  
Interestingly, Table 7 also shows that across all three proxies, ROA consistently remains 
insignificant for firms that have a sustained banking relationship, but become significant for firms lacking 
a profound banking relationship. The variable of Cash is also less significant among firms with profound 
banking relationship than those without. Relatively to other proxies for hard information, these two are 
more difficult to verify and can be easily manipulated by Chinese firms.11 This result thus highlights the 
importance of bank’s soft information in replacing the type of hard information that is subject to easy 
manipulation. 
                                                 
11 From an accounting perspective, cash manipulations are relatively limited compared to the options to manipulate 
ROAs. Nevertheless, cash manipulations are widespread among Chinese firms, especially among those of median or 
small sizes.   
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5.3 The economic impact of bank specialty: The case of earnings management 
While various proxies for firm-specific hard information capture different dimensions of a firm’s 
characteristics, they are not equally precise and credible. Since ROA is one of the most easily 
manipulated financial factors, we now further explore to what extent soft information from repeated 
lending relationship displaces hard information in the context of earnings management.  
In this respect, China as a research setting offers a unique advantage. Because of the under-
development of its stock market and constrains on other external financing sources, most Chinese firms, 
regardless of their sizes and scopes of business operations, rely on bank financing. In particular, the 
majority of Chinese firms are not publicly traded. In contrast to the other motives to manipulate earnings 
among public firms, the primary purpose of earnings management of the private firms is to obtain or 
maintain bank financing capacity and to delay the consequences associated with loan defaults.  
 To explore the role of soft information in the presence of earnings management, we first remove 
public firms from our sample. Next, we define a firm with a high degree of earnings management if the 
absolute value of its discretionary accrual falls above the sample median accrual level. The firm-specific 
discretionary accrual is estimated according to the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 
1995). The annual industry level of accruals used in this estimation comes from SINOFIN’s Chinese 
Industrial Enterprises Database.12 Due to missing values during accrual estimations, there is a reduction in 
our sample size. 
 We re-run the regression of Table 7 for both the high- and low-earnings management sub-samples. 
If the scope and sophistication of the bank’s soft information are the driving force behind how soft 
information predicts loan default and subsumes hard information that is subject to easy manipulation, we 
should expect to observe a stronger economic effect of bank specialty for the high-earnings management 
sub-sample than for the low-earnings management sub-sample, and for firms with pronounced banking 
relationship than those without. 




The probit regression results are reported in Table 8. For brevity, control variables of size, 
leverage, ROA, asset turnover, cash, sales growth, listed firm dummy, log(GDP), as well as industry and 
year fixed effects are included in the probit regression but not tabulated.  
Table 8 reveals that the economic impact of soft information is more prominent in predicting 
default for the high-earnings management sub-sample. The marginal effect associated with bank specialty 
is uniformly higher for the high-earnings management sub-sample than for the low-earnings management 
sub-sample, regardless of the proxies used for the depth of lending relationship. For example, a 1% 
increase in bank specialty leads to a 1.2% reduction in loan default probability for state-owned firms in 
the low-earnings management sub-sample, but the decline is over five times greater – a 6.5% – among 
state-owned firms in the high-earnings management sub-sample.  
In addition, the marginal effect associated with bank specialty is greater for firms of a pronounced 
banking relationship. For example, among firms that have a high degree of earnings management, a 1% 
increase in bank specialty leads to a 1.6% reduction in the probability of loan default for infrequent 
borrowers, but the decline widens to 2.5% for frequent borrowers.  
The results in Table 8 hence suggest that the impact of soft information is more dominating in the 
presence of easily manipulated hard-information, and this is especially the case when a firm has a 
profound relationship with the bank. 
 
6. ROBUSTNESS 
Our results – that the bank’s internal credit ratings significantly predict commercial loan default, 
and that soft information emerged through a sustained banking relationship displays the role of hard 
information, especially hard information subject to easy manipulation – are robust with the following 
variations in sample and key variables. 
1. We repeat the analyses (as those in Tables 5-8) excluding firms whose assets fall below the 
sample median of RMB 109.07 million since firm-specific hard information tends to be more 
precise for large firms, and the impact of factors other than information about industry, size, 
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and financial statements – such as background of senior management – is less likely to drive 
our findings. 
2. We repeat the analyses (as those in Tables 7 and 8) for the following alternative proxy 
specifications for the depth of banking relationship: Instead of dividing borrowing frequency 
and duration of banking relationship based on sample medians, we divide them based on 
sample terciles. Alternatively, we define the duration of banking relationship based on sample 
terciles. In another alternative specification, we define banking-relationship based on a firm’s 
previous borrowing frequency. Namely, a firm is classified as a frequent borrower if for its 
loans originated in 2004 it has borrowed more than 12 times from the bank (the sample 
median) in 2003, or if for its loans originated in 2005 it has borrowed more than 5 times (the 
sample median) during the period of 2003-2004. Lastly, instead of matching by industry and 
size, we remove the restrictions on state-owned and non-state-owned firms. 
3. We repeat the analyses (as those in Tables 5-6) at loan level instead of firm level. 
4. We use book value of assets as a proxy for size. Alternatively, we use the number of 
employees per firm to measure size. 
5. We use regional GDP growth instead of log(GDP) to capture macro-economic uncertainty. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we study the economic role of banks’ soft information, which evolved from a 
sustained lending relationship with a firm, in the context of loan default. Using a proprietary database 
from one of the largest state-owned commercial banks in China, we first document that proxies for firm-
specific hard information, such as financial ratios derived from firms’ financial statements, are 
significantly related to the probability of subsequent loan default, and that the bank’s internal credit rating 
scores play an important role in predicting default. 
Further analysis reveals that while the internal credit rating does incorporate firm-specific hard 
information, it is the soft information component of these ratings that contributes to the improvement in 
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assessing credit quality. In addition, we find that to what extent soft information prevails over hard 
information depends on the depth of the lending relationship. When evaluating loan delinquency, a strong 
repeated lending relationship allows soft information to substitute, rather than complement, the role of 
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APPENDIX I. Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definition Measured as of Year
Default A dummy variable that equals one if a firm defaults 
its short-term loans, and equals zero otherwise. 
Default occurs if the short-term loan is unpaid or 
written off at the end of the following year. 
This variable is 
measured at one year 
after the year when 
the loan is originated. 
Rating Bank’s internal credit rating score. The score is 12 for 
a firm with the highest credit rating, and 11 for the 
second highest credit rating, and so on. It is 1 for the 
lowest credit rating. 
This variable is 
measured as of the 
year when the loan is 
originated. 
Listed Firm A dummy variable equal to one if a firm is publicly 
traded, and zero otherwise. 
 
Size The natural log of book value of total assets at the 
end of year. 
This variable is 
measured at one year 
before the year when 
the loan is originated. 
 
Leverage Financial leverage, calculated as total liabilities 
divided by total assets at the end of year. 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as net income divided by 
total assets. 
Asset Turnover Asset turnover ratio, calculated as total sales divided 
by total assets. 
Cash Cash reserve ratio, calculated as the sum of cash and 
short-term investments divided by total assets at the 
end of year. 
Sales Growth Sales growth is calculated as the difference in the 
natural log of sales between current year and previous 
year. 
Log(GDP) The natural log of GDP per capita of the province 
where the loan is originated.  
This variable is 
measured as of the 
year when the loan is 
originated. 
State A dummy variable equal to one if a firm is owned or 
controlled by the state, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 1. Loan characteristics for Chinese firms 
The sample period is 2003-2006. A firm is classified as stated-owned if it is owned or controlled by the government.  
 
Loan maturity 
Number of firms  Number of loans  Total principal amount (billion RMB)  
Overall State-owned Non-state-owned  Overall State-owned Non-state-owned  Overall State-owned Non-state-owned 
2003 
<1 year 1,860 494 1,366 9,793 4,665 5,128 57.32 35.13 22.19 
1 year    806 333 473 3,029 1,692 1,337 32.69 25.03 7.66 
>1 & <=5 years 263 91 172 768 367 401 15.11 10.57 4.55 
>5 years 16 10 6  54 45 9  2.1 1.93 0.17 
2004 
<1 year 1,512 287 1,225 4,967 1,471 3,496 45.61 26.25 19.36 
1 year    744 225 519 2,783 1,128 1,655 30.6 19.52 11.08 
>1 & <=5 years 117 56 61 333 208 125 9.84 8.06 1.78 
>5 years 9 8 1  64 62 2  4.54 4.39 0.15 
2005 
<1 year 1,685 213 1,472 5,156 1,165 3,991 43.37 22.05 21.32 
1 year    619 167 452 2,149 847 1,302 29.14 18.73 10.41 
>1 & <=5 years 90 35 55 311 164 147 13.68 11.1 2.57 
>5 years 7 5 2  58 49 9  2.04 1.86 0.19 
2006 
<1 year 1,968 175 1,793 5,822 981 4,841 48.7 24.46 24.24 
1 year    839 155 684 2,394 867 1,527 33.15 21.21 11.94 
>1 & <=5 years 142 38 104 371 142 229 10.23 5.54 4.69 




Table 2. Internal credit rating and default rate for Chinese firms 
 
The sample period is 2003-2006. Internal credit rating starts in 2004. A crediting rating score ranks from 1 to 12, with 1 being the lowest credit quality and 
12 the highest. Short-term loan default rate is based on the fraction of short-term (one year or less) loans that are not paid or are written off at the end of the 
subsequent year. Among loans mature in less than one year, only these with a maturity of more than six months and initiated on and after 1st July are 
included. A firm is classified as stated-owned if it is owned or controlled by the government. t-statistics testing the difference in mean internal credit rating 
between state-owned and non-state-owned firms are based on uneven variance. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 Internal credit rating Short-term loan default rate 




 Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)  (5) (6) (4) - (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12)  (10) - (12) 
2003                     
<1 year           1,164 14.71% 311 25.70% 853 10.70% 41.219*** 
1 year              806 16.97% 333 21.90% 473 13.50% 9.753*** 
>1 & <=5 years                  
>5 years                                        
2004                   
<1 year 1,045 7.775  281 7.377  764 7.921 -2.508** 1,059 7.77% 198 14.60% 861 6.20% 16.246*** 
1 year    659 7.900  221 7.891  438 7.904 -0.056 744 13.03% 225 14.70% 519 12.30% 0.755 
>1 & <=5 years 95 9.547  52 9.750  43 9.302 1.114          
>5 years 7 10.429   7 10.429                            
2005                   
<1 year 1,641 7.932  209 7.981  1,432 7.925 0.268 1,129 1.90% 160 3.10% 969 1.70% 1.634 
1 year    601 8.191  163 8.276  438 8.160 0.515 619 4.37% 167 2.40% 452 5.10% 2.12 
>1 & <=5 years 73 9.397  31 10.323  42 8.714 3.531***           
>5 years 4 8.250   3 9.000  1 6.000                        
2006                    
<1 year 1,966 8.153  175 8.366  1,791 8.132 1.208           
1 year    839 8.400  155 8.755  684 8.319 2.158**           
>1 & <=5 years 142 8.972  38 10.026  104 8.587 4.591***          
>5 years 6 9.667   2 10.500  4 9.250 1.263                     
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for sample firms 
 
The sample period is 2003-2006. Dummy variable Default equals 1 if the short-term loan is not paid or is 
written off at the end of the subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. Internal credit rating ranks from 1 to 12, with 1 
being the lowest credit quality and 12 the highest. Assets are of book value and are in 100 million RMB. 
Employees are the total number of employees per firm. Other variables are defined in Appendix I. t-statistics 
are based on uneven variance. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
  2004  2005 
 Default = 0 Default = 1 t-statistics  Default = 0 Default = 1 t-statistics
Panel A: Overall sample            
Rating 8.30 5.38 11.009***  8.40 4.55 7.218*** 
Assets (in 100 million RMB) 12.40 3.71 4.927***  12.05 3.00 5.414*** 
Number of Employees 2,707 1,160 3.667***  2,252 789 4.274*** 
Leverage 0.51 0.56 -3.015***  0.48 0.55 -2.147** 
ROA 0.07 0.03 8.563***  0.09 0.05 2.796*** 
Asset Turnover 1.00 0.80 3.885***  1.25 0.90 4.004*** 
Cash 0.07 0.05 5.149***  0.07 0.04 4.183*** 
Sales Growth 0.34 0.16 2.803***  0.33 0.23 1.233 
Panel B: State-owned firms            
Rating 8.23 5.11 6.533***  8.32 4.38 3.220** 
Assets (in 100 million RMB) 32.91 7.46 4.920***  44.33 2.12 6.870*** 
Number of Employees 7,720 2,467 3.939***  8,876 893 6.107*** 
Leverage 0.55 0.62 -2.621**  0.54 0.66 -1.779 
ROA 0.04 0.02 3.599***  0.05 0.01 1.955* 
Asset Turnover 0.79 0.71 1.175  0.83 0.68 1.639 
Cash 0.09 0.06 2.556**  0.09 0.04 3.531*** 
Sales Growth 0.23 0.22 0.066  0.25 0.15 0.723 
Panel C: Non-state-owned firms            
Rating 8.33 5.53 8.744***  8.41 4.60 6.346*** 
Assets (in 100 million RMB) 4.77 1.68 2.753***  4.25 3.24 0.762 
Number of Employees 843 454 4.446***  653 761 -0.415 
Leverage 0.49 0.52 -1.623  0.46 0.52 -1.568 
ROA 0.09 0.04 7.317***  0.10 0.06 2.332** 
Asset Turnover 1.08 0.86 3.316***  1.36 0.96 3.722*** 
Cash 0.07 0.04 5.235***  0.07 0.03 3.263*** 




Table 4. Correlation analysis 
 
The sample period is 2003-2006. Dummy variable Default equals 1 if the short-term loan is not paid or is written off at the end of the subsequent year, 
and 0 otherwise. Internal credit rating ranks from 1 to 12, with 1 being the lowest credit quality and 12 the highest. Size is the log of book value of 
total assets. Other variables are defined in Appendix I. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
  Default Rating Size Leverage ROA Asset Turnover Cash Sales Growth State 
Rating -0.365***         
Size -0.057*** 0.323***        
Leverage 0.114*** -0.247*** 0.289***       
ROA -0.178*** 0.322*** -0.280*** -0.402***      
Asset Turnover -0.114*** 0.090*** -0.320*** -0.147*** 0.495***     
Cash -0.112*** 0.183*** 0.145*** 0.084*** 0.070*** 0.107***    
Sales Growth -0.069*** 0.152*** 0.019 -0.057*** 0.180*** 0.175*** 0.063***   
State 0.059*** -0.044** 0.486*** 0.208*** -0.297*** -0.230*** 0.115*** -0.078***  




Table 5.  Determinants of loan default 
 
This table reports the probit regression results. The dependent variable is the dummy variable Default 
equal to 1 if the short-term loan is not paid or is written off at the end of the subsequent year, and 0 
otherwise. Size is the log of book value of total assets. State is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
state-owned and 0 otherwise. Size, ROA, Cash, and Sales Growth are measured as one year prior to the 
time the loan was originated and described in Appendix I. Industry classification is based on 5 
manufacturing industries. For each regression model, we report both coefficient estimates and marginal 
effects. z-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Rating  -0.226***/-0.019 -0.229***/-0.018 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Size -0.137***/-0.013  0.046/0.003 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
Leverage 0.696**/0.066  -0.448/-0.034 
 (0.30)  (0.32) 
ROA -3.963***/-0.375  -0.091/-0.007 
 (1.21)  (1.01) 
Asset Turnover -0.175*/-0.017  -0.065/-0.005 
 (0.10)  (0.10) 
Cash -3.130***/-0.296  -2.074**/-0.159 
 (0.86)  (0.86) 
Sales Growth -0.029/-0.003  0.017/0.001 
 (0.08)  (0.07) 
State 2.564**/0.592  1.802/0.317 
 (1.09)  (1.16) 
State × Size -0.133**/-0.013  -0.101*/-0.008 
 (0.06)  (0.06) 
Listed Firm 0.032/0.003 -0.236/-0.016 -0.034/-0.003 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.31) 
log(GDP) -0.428***/-0.040 -0.460***/-0.038 -0.472***/-0.036 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Constant 5.666*** 4.954*** 4.658*** 
 (1.02) (0.83) (1.11) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 2,063 2,063 2,063 
Wald 2 156.7*** 279.8*** 303.6*** 




Table 6. Does internal credit rating incorporate firm-specific hard information? 
 
The sample period is 2003-2006. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the internal credit rating, ranking 
from 1 to 12, with 1 being the lowest credit quality and 12 the highest. Size is the log of book value of 
total assets. State is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is state-owned and 0 otherwise. Size, ROA, 
Cash, and Sales Growth are measured as one year prior to the time the loan was originated and are 
described in Appendix I. Industry classification is based on 5 manufacturing industries. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable in the ordered probit regression takes a value of 1 if a firm’s internal credit rating 
improves from 2004 to 2005, or from 2005 to 2006, -1 if deteriorates, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard 
errors and are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
 
Panel A Overall sample State-owned Non-state-owned 
Size 0.805*** 1.005*** 0.783*** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
Leverage -3.815*** -5.238*** -3.352*** 
 (0.30) (0.71) (0.34) 
ROA 9.651*** 22.414*** 7.930*** 
 (0.85) (2.33) (0.81) 
Asset Turnover 0.258*** 1.199*** 0.169** 
 (0.07) (0.26) (0.07) 
Cash 3.946*** 2.850** 4.003*** 
 (0.53) (1.14) (0.59) 
Sales Growth 0.247*** 0.128 0.261*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) 
State -3.641***   
 (1.21)   
State × Size 0.142**   
 (0.06)   
Listed Firm 0.162 0.094 -0.441 
 (0.21) (0.24) (0.50) 
log(GDP) -0.021 -0.103 0.028 
 (0.10) (0.18) (0.11) 
Constant -5.839*** -9.914*** -5.947*** 
 (1.07) (2.00) (1.21) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 2,063 489 1,574 
F 91.72*** 66.89*** 61.34*** 




Table 6 continued. 
 
Panel B OLS Order Probit 
Size 0.515*** 0.327*** 
 (0.15) (0.12) 
Leverage -1.986*** -1.589*** 
 (0.45) (0.34) 
ROA 5.955*** 4.696*** 
 (0.95) (0.65) 
Asset Turnover 0.181* 0.168** 
 (0.10) (0.08) 
Cash -0.411 0.110 
 (0.60) (0.45) 
Sales Growth 0.040 0.040 
 (0.06) (0.04) 
State -0.103 -0.111 
 (0.10) (0.07) 
Listed Firm -0.003 0.003 
 (0.18) (0.12) 
log(GDP) 0.069 0.038 
 (0.08) (0.06) 
Constant -1.108  
 (0.80)  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,549 1,549 
F 10.08***  
R2 0.11  
Wald 2  167.1*** 





Table 7. Bank specialty, relationship lending and loan default 
 
The sample period is 2003-2006. The dependent variable of the probit regression is the dummy variable Default equal to 1 if the short-term loan is 
not paid or is written off at the end of the subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. Bank Specialty is the residual from the OLS regression of the overall 
sample in Panel A of Table 6. A firm is stated-owned if it is owned or controlled by the state government. A firm is classified as a frequent 
(infrequent) borrower if it has borrowed from the bank at least (less than) 12 times during the sample period, where 12 is the sample median. For a 
given firm in a given year, duration is computed as the difference between the month that the firm obtained its first loan in that year and the earliest 
recorded time of its previous loans prior to that month. A firm is classified as having a long- (short-) term relationship with the bank if the duration 
is at least (less than) 24 months. For each year, state-owned and non-state-owned firms are matched by industry and size. The match is conducted 
without replacement. Size, ROA, Cash, and Sales Growth are measured as one year prior to the time the loan was originated. Industry classification 
is based on 5 manufacturing industries. For each regression model, we report both coefficient estimates and marginal effects. Robust standard errors 




Proxy for the depth of 
the relationship 
Firm’s ownership  Borrowing frequency  Duration of banking relationship 
Non-state-owned State-owned Infrequent Frequent Short Long 
Bank Specialty -0.206***/-0.014 -0.177***/-0.020 -0.215***/-0.015 -0.256***/-0.020 -0.217***/-0.014 -0.250***/-0.017 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Size -0.224***/-0.015 -0.199***/-0.023 -0.182***/-0.012 -0.172***/-0.013 -0.155***/-0.010 -0.264***/-0.018 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
Leverage 0.195/0.013 0.821/0.093 0.522/0.036 0.377/0.030 0.221/0.014 0.829/0.055 
 (0.67) (0.63) (0.40) (0.47) (0.35) (0.60) 
ROA -3.608*/-0.247 -3.952/-0.448 -2.877**/-0.196 -1.064/-0.084 -2.036**/-0.128 -3.066/-0.204 
 (2.16) (2.41) (1.24) (1.19) (1.04) (2.04) 
Asset Turnover -0.629**/-0.043 -0.036/-0.004 -0.115/-0.008 -0.038/-0.003 -0.068/-0.004 -0.263/-0.018 
 (0.29) (0.25) (0.10) (0.20) (0.11) (0.21) 
Cash -1.923/-0.132 -1.499/-0.170 -3.757***/-0.256 -2.105*/-0.165 -2.960***/-0.186 -3.275**/-0.218 
 (2.04) (1.36) (1.18) (1.21) (0.94) (1.67) 
Sales Growth -0.140/-0.010 0.138/0.016 0.049/0.003 -0.276/-0.022 -0.084/-0.005 0.154/0.010 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) (0.07) (0.14) 
Listed Firm -0.007/-0.000 -0.161/-0.017 -0.203/-0.011 -0.174/-0.012 -0.668*/-0.023 0.089/0.006 
 (0.45) (0.38) (0.43) (0.35) (0.40) (0.39) 
log(GDP) -0.826***/-0.057 -0.084/-0.009 -0.498***/-0.034 -0.503***/-0.040 -0.535***/-0.034 -0.252/-0.017 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10) (0.18) 
Constant 11.430*** 3.453 6.952*** 6.980*** 6.967*** 6.204*** 
 (2.44) (2.30) (1.42) (1.64) (1.23) (1.98) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 409 409 1,065 998 1,367 696 
Wald χ2 63.73*** 67.32*** 166.7*** 132.7*** 203.1*** 106.5*** 
Pseudo R2 0.347 0.288  0.313 0.274  0.287 0.331 
 
 37
 Table 8. Bank specialty and hard information subject to manipulation: The case of earnings management 
 
The sample period is 2003-2006. The sample contains private firms only. We define a firm with high degree of earnings management if the absolute 
value of its discretionary accrual falls above the sample median accrual level. The firm-specific discretionary accrual is estimated according to the 
modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). The dependent variable in the probit regression is the dummy variable Default equal to 
1 if the short-term loan is not paid or is written off at the end of the subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. Bank Specialty is the residual from the OLS 
regression of the overall sample in Panel A of Table 6. Firm’s ownership, borrowing frequency and duration of banking relationship are defined as 
in Table 7. For each year, state-owned and non-state-owned firms are matched by industry and size. The match is conducted without replacement. 
The same set of control variables as those in Table 7 are included in the regression analyses but are not tabulated. Industry classification is based on 
5 manufacturing industries. For each regression model, we report both coefficient estimates and marginal effects. Robust standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: High level of earnings management 
Proxy for the depth  
of relationship 
Firm’s ownership   Borrowing frequency   Duration of banking relationship 
Non-state-owned State-owned  Infrequent Frequent  Short Long 
Bank Specialty -0.215***/-0.023 -0.266***/-0.065  -0.190***/-0.016 -0.233***/-0.025  -0.181***/-0.029 -0.258***/-0.033 
 (0.08) (0.07)  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.08) 
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of observations 174 132   435 354   507 141 
 
Panel B: Low level of earnings management 
Proxy for the depth  
of relationship 
Firm’s ownership   Borrowing frequency   Duration of banking relationship 
Non-state-owned State-owned   Infrequent Frequent   Short Long 
Bank Specialty -0.084/-0.001 -0.136/-0.012  -0.166**/-0.009 -0.274***/-0.013  -0.177***/-0.006 -0.244***/-0.012 
 (0.12) (0.09)  (0.08) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) 
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of observations 155 136   317 466   403 375 
 
